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TRANSFORMING BREXIT BRITAIN
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ABSTRACT The article gives an overview of the key cultural and structural factors 
behind nationalist populism in Britain and the decision to leave the European Union 
as a result of the referendum staged in 2016 (Brexit). The article seeks to identify 
socio-economic and cultural changes that might counter nationalist populism in 
Britain through transformative change centered on a renewed Social Europe, a 
revived civil society, constitutional reform and critical multiculturalism.
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INTRODUCTION
In the 2005 general election, Michael Howard, leader of the Conservative 
Party, ran a highly populist electoral campaign guided by the lobbyist Lynton 
Crosby who became notorious for the emotive scapegoating speech acts and 
tactics that featured in his campaigns.  Crosby’s style of campaigning gave rise 
to the term “dog whistle” politics – coded language that appears to mean one 
thing to the general population, but has an additional, different, or more specific 
resonance for a targeted subgroup often centered on nativism and reactive 
forms of national identity. The campaign coordinated by Crosby in 2005 sought 
to surf the demonization of Gypsies and Travellers and migrants which had 
been orchestrated over a number of years by the tabloid media like The Sun 
newspaper which ran a series of anti-Traveller articles entitled “Stamp on the 
Camps.” Conservative leader Howard claimed that Gypsies and Travellers were 
unfairly benefitting from the Human Rights Act and a “rights culture” which 
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privileged a minority above the majority that offended the British sense of “fair 
play” (Ryder, 2015). 
At the time of the Howard/Sun campaign I was working as a policy 
development expert for Gypsy and Traveller civil society and had direct insight 
into this political moment. This incident seemed to represent a turning point, 
showing that a mainstream party in the British political system could play upon 
national identity and insecurity in a racialized context to mobilize support. This 
was not to be an isolated aberration; such invective seems to have increased its 
influence in shaping political discourse in Britain, culminating in Brexit, an 
event which is very much part of the populist turn.
What is populism? Populism appeals to the masses through speech acts 
which resonate with the emotions, including the anger of the masses. This 
can include forms of nativism and xenophobia. Populism is also an appeal to 
folkloric traditions and a desire to preserve and maintain idealized notions 
of national identity, which often encompass jingoism and bombast. Populism 
also encompasses a form of paranoia where exaggeration, suspiciousness, and 
conspiratorial fantasy are rife. Populism is an outlook which lacks refinement 
and complexity, considered by some to be crude and simplistic. It voices the 
most base thoughts and anxieties of the masses, which in previous times might 
have been easily dismissed as demagoguery or opportunism (Mudde and 
Kaltwasser, 2017). 
Identity has offered a number of communities, particularly those suffering 
from marginalization and profound change, something of an anchor and sense 
of certainty in a world that is in a state of flux produced by de-industrialization, 
globalization, mass communication, and conflict (Woodward, 2000). These 
identities can be condensed into a rigid and uniform sameness where difference 
is despised (Young, 1999). Brexit can be viewed as a form of paradigm shift, 
in which public thought about identity and nationhood is being radically and 
reactively re-orientated. Brexit is a shaper of identity, a frame used to interpret 
the past and present.
Change, and the trauma and dislocation this can cause, as well as the positives 
it heralds (namely modernization and renewal) are challenges that politicians 
have grappled with for centuries. The British response has often been to blend 
innovation with tradition and forge a consensus that appeals to a broad section 
of the electorate. One such example was the development of “One Nation” 
conservatism in the nineteenth century which stressed the importance of 
preserving established institutions and traditional values, but, coupled with 
political democracy and a social and economic program was claimed could 
benefit all, including the newly enfranchised working class. The Conservative 
prime minister Benjamin Disraeli, who was one of the first and most influential 
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proponents of One Nation Toryism, declared in a speech made in Edinburgh in 
1867:
“In a progressive country change is constant, and the question is not 
whether you should resist change which is inevitable, but whether that 
change should be carried out in deference to the manners, the customs, 
the laws, and the traditions of people, or whether it should be carried 
out in deference to abstract principles and arbitrary doctrines.” (cited in 
Blake, 1970, 363)
There is a third option concerning blending abstract principles with 
tradition in pursuit of reform; an option that characterizes Disraeli's One 
Nationism whereby a large section of the working class were enfranchised 
and important social reforms were introduced in tandem with an orchestrated 
sense of imperial destiny which bolstered certain elitist notions. Disraeli’s 
comments are of relevance to the present day: accordingly, this article seeks 
to map out a course by which institutions and traditions can be reinterpreted 
and revived using abstract principles like social justice and deliberative and 
participatory democracy. The high point of One Nationism was probably the 
age of consensus in the post-war period, sometimes referred to as the “Glorious 
Thirty” (Les Trente Glorieuses)  (Fourastié, 1979) when cross-party consensus 
saw British policy committed to full employment and an active welfare state 
in a mixed economy managed in accordance with the economic principles of 
Keynes. One Nationism became a popular leitmotif of the left and right in 
British politics. Such was the allure of One Nationism that Ed Miliband, when 
leader of the Labour Party, sought to depict Labour as a One Nation party in 
contrast to the austerity and “small state” thinking of Cameron’s premiership 
(Cruddas, 2013).
 I agree with Foucault’s (2008) assertion that the trilateral balance between 
the state, markets, and civil society has become unbalanced, with the market 
emerging as dominant. A central part of the argument propounded in this 
article is that an egalitarian Britain and Europe are prerequisites for democratic 
renewal and inclusive forms of identity. This article thus makes reference to the 
need for transformative, deep, and fundamental cultural and structural change 
but argues that such change can take place through the traditions, institutions 
and values which are inherent to the British way of life.
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Social Justice
For the past decade, Europe has faltered economically, being in the grip of 
a financial crisis which was triggered by the near economic meltdown caused 
by the financial crisis in 2008/9. The “Double Movement” (Polanyi, 1944) – 
the push for social protection against laissez-fair marketization – appears to 
have been irrevocably undermined. As the Financial Times noted in comments 
which reveal the global and cultural significance of the Brexit phenomenon, the 
Brexit victory may be “the moment when the West started to unravel” (Wolf, 
2016). Some would argue that this turn of events was the inevitable consequence 
of the dominance of the Washington Consensus, whereby neoliberalism and 
marketization have led to an emphasis on deregulation and profitability. Rather 
than weakening such forms of capitalism, the crisis bolstered it through austerity 
regimes which cut back on welfare programs, shrinking the state to levels which 
surpassed the greatest aspirations of Thatcherism. In Britain there was some 
irony in this development, as David Cameron, the prime minister who presided 
over these cuts, had portrayed himself as being of the One Nation conservative 
tradition, in contrast to the more partisan political philosophy of Thatcherism. 
In a further irony, it was Cameron’s inability to face down the radical right in 
his own party, coupled with a fear of the rise of UKIP, which led to his pledging 
a referendum in the 2015 election, a pledge which led to his own downfall when 
the Remain campaign narrowly lost the resulting poll.
Following Cameron’s departure, conservatism under Theresa May and 
then Boris Johnson remained wedded to neoliberal orthodoxies. In fact, their 
support for forms of hyperglobalism hailed the prospects of a hard Brexit 
(leaving the EU customs union and negotiating independent trade deals) as 
leading to a renewal of British success: namely, “Global Britain.” Brexit has 
been heralded as a chance to complete the “Thatcher revolution” (Lawson, 
2016). Also, in seeking to deter a soft Brexit by ending freedom of movement, 
the Conservatives have sought to manipulate anti-migrant sentiment, while 
in this process nativist rhetoric has entered the political mainstream. A hard 
Brexit promises not just radical economic freedoms, but, as with Thatcherism, 
a renewed sense of national identity and pride. Conservative support for Brexit 
is couched as an effort to protect and uphold British sovereignty. Such is the 
intensity of the influence of this English nationalism that the Conservatives 
appear willing to abandon another tenet of One Nationism; namely, a 
commitment to preserve the Union of the UK. The Conservatives have paid 
little attention to the protests and concerns of Scottish nationalists about a 
hard Brexit, thus bolstering calls for a new independence referendum (Hayton, 
2018). The Conservative Party has shown a propensity to metamorphose into 
TRANSFORMING BREXIT BRITAIN 107
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY VOL. 10 (2019) 2
something more akin to a populist entity, giving credence to the predictions 
of Polanyi and Dahrendorf that neoliberalism can potentially transform 
into forms of fascism and authoritarianism in times of crisis. Such detours 
and innovations, as reflected by nativist and isolationist sentiments that are 
pronounced in desires for a hard Brexit, ostensibly might appear to contradict 
globalization, but the fusion of neoliberalism and nationalist populism 
seems to be a relatively simple form of political merger, facilitating further 
downsizing and the dilution of social protections (Fekete, 2016).
From a review of the 2016 referendum result it became evident that there is 
a strong correlation between wealth and income and support for Brexit, with a 
large proportion of low-income groups and depressed areas supporting Brexit. 
Thus, a new social contract should be part of the counter-narrative and response 
to Brexit. At times, however, leftist thinking has been more in kilter with 
populist trends, as reflected in notions that Britain’s socialist future could be 
assured outside of the EU (as encapsulated in “Lexit,” a leftist version of Brexit, 
which perceives the EU as an enforcer of neoliberal policies). 
In a globalised world, the notion of “socialism in one country” is dangerously 
outdated. Given the opposition to such changes from economic elites and the 
potential for flights of capital in retaliation, such change would need to take 
place in unison within international trading blocs. This was the logic of the 
EU before it became market driven and embraced ordoliberalism: the founders 
of the EU project had envisaged forms of economic and social solidarity for 
safeguarding the European social model (Crouch, 2018). Returning to earlier 
conceptions of the European project will be integral to persuading Britain to 
remain or return and bring about a new social contract across Europe.
 EU structural and regional funds have not been able to address economic 
disparities, a failure compounded by the financial restrictions of the Stability 
and Growth Pact promoted by German Chancellor Angela Merkel to bolster the 
Eurozone, which, according to critics, accentuated the problems of the financial 
crisis through austerity policies (Avis, 2014). The ordoliberal austerity imposed 
upon the Eurozone has also compromised the democratic accountability of the 
EU, further eroding public trust and support (Farnsworth and Irving, 2018). 
The concept of “Social Europe” stresses the value of increasing labor market 
participation, places much more emphasis on active welfare state measures, 
introducing supply-side efforts at job creation, creating measures to provide 
security other than life-time job tenure, and prioritizing efforts to combat social 
exclusion. Social Europe might offer a panacea for the ills of Europe (Seikel, 
2016). DiEM25 is campaigning for a European New Deal, a call echoed by 
the Confederation of German Trade Unions which has called for a European-
style Marshall Plan. 
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A policy centered on a renewed Social Europe would not be able to revive the 
Keynesian mixed economy of the post-war era, as expansion during that period 
was based on rapid growth. Such a model may not be sustainable environmentally 
because of the level of resources that were and would be devoured to fuel rapid 
growth. In addition, post-war growth was also based on cheap materials and 
exploitation of low-wage labor from regions of the periphery, and within the 
new globalised economic order such terms could not be replicated (Benton, 
2018). However, these factors, whilst impeding a return to previous models 
of welfare and socio-economic consensus, do not mean that transformative 
change is impossible. In the current economic system, unprecedented wealth is 
owned by a super elite, which could be redistributed through greater levels of 
progressive taxation and a global tax on elites, as Piketty (2014) has advocated. 
New socio-economic models will entail less consumerism given the slower rates 
of growth that would be possible and the environmental restraints needed to 
limit future damage. The key point though, is that Britain will need to stay 
in the EU for any future government to have a chance of being able to deliver 
transformative change; to attempt to do so isolated and outside of the EU would 
lead to penalties and punishments being inflicted by the market. In addition, a 
Britain which opts for a harder Brexit outside of the customs union and which 
is free to make independent trade deals would be following a policy trajectory 
which seeks to dismantle social protections in order to achieve maximum 
profitability and competitivity.
TAKING CONTROL
The political attachment of society to democratic norms, and the values and the 
procedures of a liberal democratic constitution have been termed Constitutional 
Patriotism by Habermas (1994); the latter is dependent on rational discussion 
and debate – principles, some would argue, that were absent in the referendum. 
In Britain, the Westminster model has held sway (a more centralized form 
of political governance, as opposed to the continental model whereby forms 
of proportional representation have a greater tendency to produce a coalition 
government leading to an emphasis on consensus building and deliberation). 
In contrast, the Westminster system is more hierarchical and less inclined to 
compromise. Britain has a restrictive form of representative democracy which 
compounds voters’ sense of alienation from the political process by appearing to 
act primarily in the interests of elites which appear to be distant and disconnected. 
The resulting mistrust and alienation from the political establishment meant 
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that entreaties for Britain to remain within the EU during the referendum were 
ignored in some quarters: in fact, Brexit was perceived as an assault on the 
elitism and vested interests of the political class. 
Laclau and Mouffe (1985) contend that liberal democracy and anodyne forms 
of consensus have created an empty and meaningless form of politics in which 
politicians in the mainstream sound the same and premise their thoughts and 
actions on an unquestioning adherence to neoliberalism. Basically, the centre 
and left of politics has shifted to the extent that the Les Trente Glorieuses and 
the vision of the social contract it represents have been profoundly undermined. 
Nationalism and populism have sought to fill this political vacuum with pledges 
to upend the status quo (Jones, 2014). Laclau and Mouffe advocate a form of 
democracy which seeks to move away from the essentialism and determinism 
of traditional radical left politics of the post-war period and embraces a renewed 
liberal democracy (radical pluralism) as a means by which transformative 
politics can be advanced. It can be described as the politics of choice, contrast, 
and contestation (agonism), in which an adversarial politics of “us” and 
“them” comes into play (Mouffe, 1999). Such views were shaped by Schmitt’s 
(1976) adversarial view of politics, where the chances of reaching consensus 
are minimized through a collective nation-building dynamic at the centre of 
politics. In contrast, radical pluralists have sought to focus on frames centered 
on economic and social justice rather than nationalism. 
Fassin has criticized what he perceives as the leftist populism of Laclau and 
Mouffe, claiming it is fuelled by resentment, which ultimately, as with nationalist 
populism, cannot be immune to reaction and scapegoating (Hamburger, 
2018). This is evident with a faction like the radical left political organization 
Momentum that operates within the British Labour Party which is committed 
to grassroots activism and support for the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn. Left 
populism has at times resorted to crude binary frames to mobilize mass 
movements. In this sense it has displayed the classic traits of populism, relying 
on charismatic leadership and a simplistic rhetoric of resentment which crowds 
out the possibility for independent thought and deliberation. In the factional 
struggle within Labour between Momentum and its opponents, party members 
with diverging views are denounced as “plotters” against the leadership of 
Corbyn, or Blairites wedded to a neoliberal order: a mindset that threatens to 
undermine the broad-church traditions of the Labour Party. Laclau reflects 
the stridency of some on the left by deriding Habermas as a naïve universalist 
on account of his desire to see a consensus forged by deliberation. However, 
argumentation and deliberation, although being slower and less decisive than 
coercion and collective “will,” might be a more secure means of developing 
long-term, stable transformative policy trajectories (Garnham, 2007).
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However, Mouffe (2005) does believe that forms of consensus are useful in 
formulating a common symbolic space centered on the principles of equality 
and liberty, although there should simultaneously be space for disagreement 
as to how these principles are applied, with those who do not ascribe to these 
ideals being excluded from the democratic debate. Rawls (1971) espoused forms 
of economic consensus about curbing the rapacity of economic elites so that the 
life chances of the majority are not impinged on. Rawls has been classified as 
part of the liberal tradition of political philosophy which largely maintained the 
status quo, but in the wake of four decades of neoliberal hegemony his views 
could be construed as more egalitarian ones in the present political climate. 
Indeed, it could be claimed that Rawl’s notion of building consensus through 
an incremental and gradualist progress in the tradition of social democracy 
could ultimately achieve radical forms of social justice. For some, this was 
the perceived trajectory of post-war policy in many European states before 
the advent of neoliberalism, perhaps most successfully achieved in countries 
like Sweden. In more recent times Habermas has sought to revive notions of 
consensus based on deliberation within liberal politics, although his writings 
contain a corresponding commitment to social justice through his call for 
advocacy to reverse corporate capitalism. 
A central question for those interested in progressive politics is whether the 
radical pluralism of Laclau and Mouffe and the deliberative consensual politics 
of Rawls and Habermas might be fused. Deliberative politics, it could be argued, 
has an important advantage over agonism in an age when politics seems to be 
increasingly characterized by fissure and dissension, as it does not provoke and 
mobilize the support base of the adversary through polemic and disagreement. 
Instead, deliberative politics, through dialogue, reinterpretation, and re-
orientation, seeks to dilute the views of its adversaries and convert them. The 
challenge is to achieve such a state of affairs without recourse to the anodyne 
politics of the neoliberal consensus that Mouffe and Laclau condemn, and which 
many contend has failed. In the Les Trente Glorieuses consensus, deliberation, 
and social justice formed a gradualist trajectory based on forms of welfare 
and social protection, enabling society to achieve what some have termed the 
“good society,” but which was interrupted by the Washington Consensus. 
Constituencies of opinion that mobilized in support of Brexit, especially in the 
de-industrialized and “left behind” communities, could be persuaded to re-
orientate their political aspirations if promised a version of the “good society” 
that would entail transformative interventionist and redistributive policies with 
the ability to create work and rebuild communities. This could be part of a 
counter-narrative to the politics of nativism. In tandem with such interventions, 
cultural frames would need to be re-orientated through conceptions of identity 
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and nationhood that do not rest upon the frame of resentment. Mouffe (1999) 
has sought to transform antagonism into agonism and marginalize the potency 
of such reactive frames by accepting that compromises can be achieved with the 
“adversary” in what are described as temporary respites. Hence, there appears 
to be the potential for forms of deliberation and consensus-building within 
radical pluralism.
Mouffe and Laclau support grassroots politics, building on the ideas of Gramsci 
and the frames of new social movements centered on intersectional notions of 
gender, sexuality, ethnicity, and economic justice. In this sense, their thought 
chimes with current leftist populist movements in Europe like Podemos, Syriza, 
and Labour under Corbyn. Even though Laclau and Mouffe support direct forms 
of democracy, they note that such is the technical complexity of governance that 
forms of representative government are inevitable. Thus, it might be possible to 
fuse aspects of direct and deliberative forms of democracy. 
Institutional democracy is a concept that might offer a panacea for the challenges 
facing modern democracies. It welds diverse approaches to decision making 
through overlapping forms of representative, participatory, and associative 
forms of decision-making (O’Donnell, 2018). A transformative political 
agenda could redistribute both resources and power. Such notions translated 
into action are evident in Brazil where representative democracy co-exists 
with empowering forms of localized decision making such as peoples’ budgets 
where local assemblies are consulted about the direction of local spending. A 
key dynamic of Habermas’s (2010) political thought is deliberative democracy, 
where communicative action and new social movements create consensus and 
mutual understanding, creating the possibility for citizens to reframe their 
interests and perspectives in light of a joint search for common interests and 
mutually acceptable solutions. Cultural and economic transformative change 
as outlined in this article will necessitate persuasion and education through 
deliberation. 
In an effective representative democracy the furtherance of the “greater 
good” warrants representatives being endowed with what can be described as 
“representative judgment,”  reaching a balance between the individual, plural, 
and common needs and aspirations of a community in total and translating 
that into fair and rational decisions that uphold core values (Chalmers, 
2017). Representative judgment does not yield to what might be the emotive 
and temporal views of the mass at a given moment. A lawmaker (member 
of parliament) should be informed by public opinion and provide a rationale 
for unpopular decisions they make but not slavishly follow the mood of a 
given moment, especially as emotions might be stirred in forms of hysteria 
orchestrated by the media and other such actors (Parvin, 2009). The electorate 
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hold the ultimate power, of course, by being able to vote out any lawmaker who 
they feel has not adequately respected their sentiments. 
Rousseau (1762) asserted that representative democracy constituted a loss 
of freedom, as opposed to direct democracy that articulated the “will” of the 
people, thus some on the left have been purists in supporting such notions 
of democracy aligned closely with decentralized decision making in which 
localized assemblies play a pivotal role. The political thinker Ralph Miliband 
(1961) derided the Labour Party for being seduced by the parliamentary 
tradition and losing its radical edge, but support for representative democracy 
may not necessarily curtail the possibilities of transformative change. Michael 
Foot as leader of the Labour Party championed the concept of representative 
judgment, believing members of parliament should be independent minded 
and not harnessed to the will of local Labour Party management committees 
(Pugh, 2010). What could be termed “minipublics” composed of deliberative 
local assemblies, citizen juries, and deliberative polls could be the antidote 
to political systems that can be characterized as suffering from elitism and 
a sense of disconnection between lawmakers and voters. Gordon Brown 
(2019), a former prime minister, recognized the need for a “root-and-branch” 
national conversation about the direction of Britain when he called for citizen’s 
assemblies to be established, arguing that these regional public hearings would 
develop new approaches and re-establish trust that has been lost between MPs 
and their constituents and help guide and inform decisions made about Brexit, 
thereby breaking the deadlock that has been reached concerning this issue.
The integrity of the political process could be further enhanced by introducing 
greater regulation and control over political funding. Sixty-one percent of the 
funds for the Brexit campaign were provided by five rich individuals. Among 
these contributors was Arron Banks, a wealthy businessman who spent an 
estimated 11 million pounds on social media from 2011 to promote a Leave 
agenda (Shipman, 2016). Banks also heavily financed Nigel Farage and is 
reported to have financed a house and chauffeur for him since 2016 (money which 
Farage failed to properly record in the EU parliament’s register of interests). 
Questions have been raised as to how Banks could afford to support Leave to 
the extent he did given the alleged financial difficulties of his business, and 
questions have been raised about his links with Russia (Sloan and Campbell, 
2017). The National Crime Agency though reported in 2019 that it found no 
evidence of criminality after investigating a series of claims against the Brexit 
campaign group Leave.EU and Arron Banks. However, greater regulation of 
funding and even state financing of political parties may be needed to restore 
trust and transparency in British politics.
The events of Brexit and how the executive sought to use its powers to 
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steamroll its interpretation of Brexit through parliament by introducing its 
Withdrawal Agreement Bill to parliament no less than four times in what 
was perceived to be an attempt by the administration of Theresa May to wear 
down and intimidate parliament into supporting the requisite legislation have 
damaged democracy. The action of the May administration was interpreted by 
some critics as executive arrogance and bullying that undermined parliamentary 
conventions, many of which are based on unwritten practice and custom. To 
ensure that parliamentary tradition is respected in future, a written constitution 
with strong checks and balances on the power of the executive may be required. 
The transformation of the House of Lords, with an elected second chamber 
and proportional representation in the Westminster system coupled with the 
extension of regional government to the regions of England, would make British 
politics more consensual and deliberative and similar to continental politics.
The French president Emmanuel Macron has pledged a “rebuilding” of the 
EU to reverse the breakdown in trust and support that has occurred. According 
to Macron (2017), this will entail   an integrated eurozone with its own financial 
minister, parliament, and a standalone budget to head off future crises. Critics 
argue though that Macron’s centrist “third way” approach may not be sufficient 
to meet the challenge of the surge of support for nationalist populism, and such 
measures may be more of the same hierarchical and technocratic approaches 
that have already alienated so many in Europe. Some argue for a stronger focus 
on what has been described as the Social Pillar of the EU, an active and dynamic 
welfare and growth policy whereby social rights take precedence over the 
competition rules of the single market in order to create a notion of a “European 
dream.”
THE PUBLIC SPHERE
The public sphere is a social space where different opinions are expressed, 
problems of general concern are discussed, and collective solutions might be 
developed. The media is a central  dynamic in this sphere. Critics have long 
raised concerns about the concentration of media power and ownership in the 
hands of a small privileged elite in Britain, most notably in relation to Rupert 
Murdoch, owner of The Sun and The Times. The marketization of the media 
has also created a mass culture where marketing techniques centered on slogans 
and emotive manipulation have colonized politics: as noted earlier, “dog whistle 
politics” have become a more apparent feature of British politics in recent 
decades. 
ANDREW RYDER 114
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY VOL. 10 (2019) 2
The Brexit referendum was something of a culmination of a long process of 
securitization. Securitization describes how power elites are able to use speech 
acts to play upon or construct perceptions of insecurity and fear and thus mobilize 
and frame thought and action to a priority level; an “emergency politics” which 
sets aside the normal process of decision making (Stritzel, 2007). Post-truth 
politics is another aspect of what has become an increasingly unstable public 
sphere where emotions rather than facts are at a premium, and coupled with 
distorted and sensationalist media reporting such phenomena have done much 
to undermine the quality of public debate and discourse. New measures are 
needed to raise the quality, accuracy, and balance of the media, where greater 
attention is given to those outside the governing class, especially those at the 
margins, and greater attention is paid to the ethics of journalism and the public 
information service role of the media. 
Print media is in decline and the influence of social media has steadily 
grown. The Leave campaign enjoyed a dominant role in social media. On 
Twitter, sentiment was (on average, for much of the campaign) two-thirds in 
support of Leave, as opposed to a third for Remain (Llewellyn and Cram, 
2016). Arron Banks hired the US pollster and referendum expert Gerry 
Gunster to acquire quantitative data; this involved sophisticated mining 
techniques whereby personal data was “scraped” from social media such as 
Facebook accounts. This data was then used to segment the population through 
classification, and then micro-targeting of the electorate was undertaken to 
shape voting behavior. Targeting involved the transmission of sharp messages 
likely to invoke key feelings and anxieties, and was a prominent feature of 
the Banks-and-Farage-supported “Leave.EU,” one of the two principal leave 
campaign groups in the referendum. The other group was “Vote Leave,” 
which was a more mainstream Conservative operation that hired Aggregate 
IQ, a software data firm with connections to Cambridge Analytica, a company 
partly established by Steve Bannon that was used to assist the Trump election 
campaign. Aggregate IQ built up a core audience and used a Facebook tool 
called “Lookalike Audiences”: an audience-builder which helped identify 
similar people (Shipman, 2016). This aspect of the campaign is now at the 
centre of some controversy as it appears that privacy agreements may have 
been violated. Concerns have been raised about the almost Orwellian use of 
social media and messaging to influence voting intentions, especially when 
emotive and non-factual codes are relied upon. 
Thus, another important area in need of reform is social media and its influence 
on decision-making and the privacy of personal data. Aside from more stringent 
regulations, the large online monopolies of Google and Facebook should be 
broken up and made subject to greater scrutiny. The British parliament last 
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passed substantive legislation on data protection 15 years ago, which Rawnsley 
(2018) notes is “like trying to govern the airline industry with rules made for hot-
air ballooning.” The European Union has activated a General Data Protection 
Regulation that will give users more power to opt out of being tracked online 
and prevent their data being shared with third parties. It is probable, however, 
that greater enforcement and regulation is needed.
COMMUNITY MOBILIZATION
Traditionally, civil society has been a bridge and even mediator between 
government and communities. Under the premiership of David Cameron, 
promises to bolster and extend the role of civil society in British society were 
made as part of the “Big Society” agenda. Big Society was a communitarian 
vision of society that sought to see social capital and volunteerism become an 
important dynamic in community governance and a key plank in Cameron’s 
efforts to cast himself in the One Nation tradition. In truth, despite the marketing 
and hype of Big Society, it equaled the “small state” as Cameron’s post-financial 
crisis austerity measures greatly reduced the strength and independence of 
civil society. Where civil society has survived, it has often found itself tied 
into service delivery contracts or businesslike operational models. A renewed 
civil society, coupled with a new sense of constitutional patriotism (see above 
discussion), is a prerequisite for reinforcing the norms and values that may 
withstand the reactive populist sentiments of Brexit. 
The EU referendum result might have been different if there had been a 
stronger and more vibrant network of grassroots-orientated civil society 
groups, particularly in those marginalized communities that voted heavily to 
leave. An autonomous and well-funded civil society can also help reconnect 
some of the most marginalized in society. A renewed civil society can facilitate 
what Freire (1994) envisaged as a catalyst for marginalized groups, supporting 
them in developing a critical consciousness, and by training and supporting 
them in participating not just in decision-making but also in economic activity 
through fostering economic cooperatives and mutualism. Such initiatives might 
enhance the collective and individual capabilities of communities, forming 
a subaltern counter sphere (Fraser, 1992). In other words, civil society can 
constitute a discursive arena where the marginalized can invent and promote 
counter discourses and formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, 
interests, and needs, furthering the politics and policies of redistribution, 
recognition, and representation.
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CRITICAL MULTICULTURALISM
In 2019, a report revealed that Brexit identities were stronger than party 
identities, with the country almost equally divided as to whether they saw 
themselves as Remain or Leave, both having become frames which encompassed 
distinct views and values (UK in a Changing World, 2019). An important 
question is whether this divide can be overcome. In the referendum there was 
an important correlation between demographics and the vote to leave the EU. 
Brexit nationalism thus highlights a series of fissures, with poorer communities, 
especially in the North and Midlands, being more likely to have voted leave 
than affluent/metropolitan areas that were more cosmopolitan in their outlook. 
Again reflecting class, the less educated were more likely to vote leave than 
the educated, while older voters were more likely to vote leave than younger 
ones. Large numbers of Conservative supporters with more insular conceptions 
of English identity were also prominent in the constituency supporting Brexit. 
Approximately 60 percent of over-fifties voted leave, in contrast to the 70 percent 
of 18-24-year-olds who opted for remain. Older voters could be described as 
the “carriers of cultural legacy”: socialized, indoctrinated, and habituated in 
a particular cultural milieu. Perhaps the imprint of British exceptionalism, 
Empire, and war was most evident among this demographic age group.
 These divides represent in some cases deep cultural chasms in which an 
accepted and deeply held liberal-minded tolerance of minorities and difference, 
strongly evident in metropolitan and urban areas and once deemed to be 
dominant and mainstream, are in fact deeply at odds with a counter-narrative 
of fear and resentment that may be found in de-industrialized and rural areas. 
Cultural resistance to progressive values can be viewed as a silent counter-
revolution (Ignazi, 1992). There is in fact a cleavage between cosmopolitan and 
nationalist mindsets, a cultural civil war that can only be resolved through a 
deep and intense national conversation about who the British are, and where 
they think they are going.
The cultural backlash to more liberal and multicultural developments in 
British post-war society is in part a byproduct of the conservatism of the British 
media that has instigated a decades-long crusade against liberal values and 
diversity. As noted at the start of this article, the Sun newspaper’s “Stamp on the 
Camps” anti-Traveller campaign, and a host of other such campaigns centered 
on attacks on migrants, the bureaucracy of the EU, and the perceived dangers 
of Islam can be viewed as a “moral panic.” Moral panics and a fear of “folk 
devils” help normalize mainstream institutions, values and community voices 
(social guardians) who claim that they represent the majoritarian view based on 
tradition and/or established behavior and who castigate those (folk devils) who 
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are deemed to deviate from convention. Successful panics and acts of collective 
hysteria resonate with deeper historical, cultural, and structural anxieties which 
can reinforce boundary maintenance in a neurotic form of “us” and “them” 
(Cohen, 2016).
In response to cultural backlash, there is also a need to nurture inclusive 
forms of identity and community relations. In the 1960s and 1970s, liberal 
forms of multiculturalism and integration replaced assimilation, embodying a 
version of liberal “tolerance” based on the assumption that there was a dominant 
cultural identity to which incoming ethnic minorities had to adjust, but to 
whom concessions could be made. Liberal conceptions of multiculturalism 
could be patronizing and tokenistic. Some minority groups have themselves 
been critical of multiculturalism, claiming that it caricatures their culture in 
a simplistic manner which often reduces the presentation of minority cultures 
to a homogeneous, static, and conflict-free caricature (Sarup, 1991). Critics 
argue that this version of multiculturalism does not deal with the central cause 
of racism, such as racist attitudes expressed through teacher hostility and low 
expectations, bullying, and institutional racism (Bulmer and Solomos, 1999). In 
addition, liberal forms of multiculturalism have often ignored white culture and 
failed to celebrate and explore it alongside minority cultures, causing further 
anger and resentment from white society (Back, 1996). An alternative approach 
is presented in the form of critical multiculturalism which is intersectional in 
the sense it is interested in the linkages between race, gender, and class and 
challenges oppressive behaviors within majority and minority society that 
might stem from tradition and custom. Such a notion can be described as “two-
way integration,” where the identities of all ethnic groups, including white 
majoritarian society in the UK and Europe, undergo processes of change as 
the overarching national community and sense of identity emerges (Modood, 
2012). Such conceptions may be the antidote to the new assimilationism that 
emerged post 9/11 and the rise of nationalist populism. Critical multiculturalism 
encourages a form of hyper-pluralism, where innovation and imagination is 
encouraged but is steered by reason and principle, allowing for meaningful 
responses to an ever-changing world.
THE MIGRATION DEBATE
With the accession of Central Eastern European States to the EU, migration 
from the EU to Britain greatly increased. Migration from within the EU rose 
from 15,000 individuals in 2003 to 180,000 in 2015. Kaufman (2018) identifies 
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immigration as the principal and most decisive factor for those voting “Leave” 
in the referendum – 33 percent of those who voted Leave thought it was the 
best chance for Britain to regain control over immigration and its borders 
(Salter, 2018). Post-industrial austerity-hit communities have been prominent 
in expressing resentment about migration, in contrast to the enthusiasm about 
diversity of the more materially fortunate liberal metropolitan elite (Seidler, 
2018). The issue of intra- and wider migration has been increasingly securitized 
and referred to as the cause of unemployment, the rise of the informal economy, 
and the crisis of the welfare state. Second, the security factor is linked to the 
“loss-of-control” narrative associated with the issue of sovereignty, borders, and 
both internal and external security. The third factor is linked to identity, where 
migrants are seen as a threat to national identity and demographic equilibrium. 
As part of the securitized debate around migration, a key argument from the 
right of political opinion is that freedom of movement and an “influx” of Central-
East-European migrants has led to unemployment, pressure on services, and a 
loss of English identity in some communities. The reality of the situation though, 
is that migrants make a positive contribution to the economy, tax revenues, and 
service delivery in areas like health care (Andor, 2014). English left nationalism 
accepts some of the central tenets of the Leave trope by asserting that free 
movement of labor aids the neoliberal economy by depressing wage rates. Others 
on the left are alarmed at the nativism that such migration prompts, leading to 
the rise of radical-right parties propelled by a strong anti-immigrant stance, 
which in some cases is leading to traditional left parties hemorrhaging electoral 
support (Chakrabortty, 2016). Such sentiments contrast with progressive political 
sentiments, which advocate robust anti-discrimination policies and measures to 
counteract the economic manipulation of migrants and wage protection and thus 
oppose restrictive immigration policies (Global Unions, 2013).
A Social Europe (see discussion above) would raise the socio-economic 
condition of depressed parts of Central Eastern Europe through redistributive 
policies and targeting regions and economic sectors suffering from skills 
shortages as a consequence of intra-migration. Such initiatives could create 
incentives for workers to stay in their home countries or be replaced through 
extensive training programs. In migrant-receiving countries where services and 
the availability of accommodation is under pressure due to migration – often 
poorer inner-city areas –, it would be of value if the EU and national governments 
could make available more targeted funds for alleviating such pressures, which 
are major contributory factors to the undermining of community cohesion. 
Thus, employment and social standards should be protected not by restrictions 
but by the enforcement of rights and greater targeted financial support for areas 
affected by migration. 
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CONCLUSION
The article has presented the argument that austerity and cuts bolstered support 
for Brexit and were a reflection of the resentment and anxiety of depressed and 
left-behind communities. Brexit can also be construed as an attempt to revive 
and promote forms of white identity imbued with notions of exceptionalism, 
fuelled by a form of English nationalism which is inward looking and deeply 
nostalgic. These resentments and outlooks have been stoked and framed by 
tabloid journalism, giving rise to forms of crude rhetoric and forms of populism 
which threaten to upend British democracy as we know it. The populist turn 
has been surfed by a range of nationalist politicians, but has included the 
Conservative Party recasting itself in the populist mould, evidenced by its 
support for a hard Brexit, and the fact that at the time of writing Boris Johnson 
had been elected the new leader of the Conservative Party. Johnson, with his 
personality and media-focused politics, advocacy of a no-deal or hard Brexit 
and affinity with Trump, is very much a politician shaped in the populist mould.
As noted in the article, the left of British politics has not been immune to the 
populist surge, with sections of the left advocating a leftist nationalist vision of 
a Labour exit from the EU (Lexit). The irony is that addressing the root socio-
economic causes of Brexit then remaining in the EU and helping to formulate a 
Social-Europe response to inequality are essential parts of the counter-response 
to the forces behind the Brexit phenomenon. 
The search for consensus is in itself something very British; a veneration no 
less of open discussion, reason, and a “one-nation” conception of politics which 
seeks to bolster the imagined unity of nation by minimizing social inequalities 
– in other words, the British practice of introducing innovation through existing 
institutions and practices, or putting “old wine into new bottles.” The appreciation 
of such a stance is evidenced by the fact that around forty Conservative MPs, 
in response to the growing influence of hard Brexiteers, have formed a political 
grouping that seeks to protect and uphold the principles of One Nationism and 
to help steer the country into a softer form of Brexit. Likewise, under Corbyn, 
Labour sought to portray itself as a champion of consensus by supporting a 
vision of Brexit that whilst leaving the EU could uphold social protections in an 
effort to bring the country back together. These efforts to create consensus rest on 
forms of compromise and caution that fail to address the fundamental causes of 
Brexit. As suggested in this article, a sustainable form of national unity can only 
be achieved through transformative change in relation to economic management 
with enhanced social protection; a notion of identity that is intercultural and 
inclusive, and, most importantly of all, a rejection of Brexit and the embrace of 
a stay-and-reform agenda centered on Social Europe.
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It will be evident to the reader that this article advocates the democratization 
of democracy through the reform of existing institutions within a policy 
framework that advocates a radical shift away from neoliberalism. The radical 
Left has often been characterized as seeing the EU as a market-driven project 
for transnational capitalism in which the free movement of capital can be 
guaranteed. In contrast, the centre Left is deemed to have embraced the market 
but perceives the EU as a civilizational project shaped by enlightenment ideals 
which promote tolerance and egalitarianism (Susen, 2017). This article has 
sought to fuse these approaches by advocating a reformed EU centered on a 
renewed Social Europe which is robust in promoting and facilitating intervention 
and redistribution, but in which the pluralist traditions and institutions of EU 
Member States can be strengthened through greater media regulation and 
placing limits on patronage and financial influence in the political system. The 
article also argues that democracy needs to be bolstered through empowering 
civil society and complementing representative democracy with new forms of 
participatory and direct decision making. We live in a time of flux, crisis, and 
contestation: time will tell which vision – namely, populist nationalism or a new 
Social Europe – emerges triumphant.
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